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INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROTECTIONS 
FOR MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES: A 
RESPONSE TO FATHER BRENNAN 
MARY ELLEN O’CONNELL* 
Abstract: Father Brennan’s Essay, “Human Rights and the National Inter-
est: The Case Study of Asylum, Migration, and National Border Protec-
tion,” is a complex legal and ethical analysis of refugee law. This Com-
mentary focuses on one aspect of the international law relevant to the Es-
say, namely, state obligations to migrants. Father Brennan’s main argu-
ment that migrants and refugees may be turned back, so long as the action 
respects human rights law, is consistent with the human right to life. Just-
ly stopping migrants and refugees requires states to stop them before they 
enter either international waters or the state’s territorial waters. Further, 
Father Brennan is right to critique some of the more extensive claims for 
state duties toward migrants and refugees. Where the advocacy communi-
ty could direct their efforts more fully is to the causes of forced migration. 
Addressing these issues is the only way to sufficiently respect refugees 
and properly preserve national borders. 
INTRODUCTION 
It is a privilege to comment on this case study of asylum, migration, and 
national border protection. Father Brennan is a true expert on the law most rel-
evant to the study—international refugee law. Refugee law is a highly complex 
area of international law and not one in which I am expert. Nevertheless, I 
have been called upon in the past to think about the challenges of implement-
ing, enforcing, and amending refugee law from the perspective of an interna-
tional law generalist. That is the approach I take again here, hoping it is of 
some value in thinking about some of Father Brennan’s important questions of 
concern. My focus here will be narrower than his—seeking only to comment 
on what international law requires when desperate human beings attempt to 
reach places of safety and prosperity where they are not citizens. 
This Commentary makes four points with respect to Father Brennan’s ap-
proach and international law. First, his conclusion that “stopping the boats is a 
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precondition to finding a politically acceptable, compassionate, and fair solu-
tion” is consistent with the fundamental legal and moral principle at stake: the 
human right to life.1 Second, stopping the boats means stopping them before 
they leave shore. Once they are at sea, all ships, including those of the Austral-
ian Navy, have a duty to save lives based on rules separate from refugee law.2 
On board an official vessel, the flag state has jurisdiction over the rescued per-
son and is required to apply relevant refugee law and international human 
rights law.3 Third, in my view, Father Brennan is correct that some in the legal 
community, although well intentioned, seem nevertheless to exaggerate the 
extent of state obligations under refugee law and international human rights 
law. Finally, though I agree with Father Brennan’s analysis and proposals for 
the short term, I want to add that it is also essential to address the deeper caus-
es of today’s migration crisis—armed conflict and climate change are both 
linked to why people flee. Responding to these challenges, especially by re-
newing knowledge and respect for general international law, is an integral part 
of any effective effort respecting migration, refugees, and national borders. 
I. STOP THE BOATS 
Father Brennan begins with a confession of error. He believes that he was 
wrong to support certain changes to Australia’s refugee law in light of the fact 
that, between 2007 and 2013, some 1200 people lost their lives at sea while 
attempting to reach Australian shores.4 His humility is an example for all. In 
his Essay, he sets out his new position, which focuses centrally on saving the 
lives of people who might drown at sea.5 He makes a powerful case for stop-
ping the boats as a matter of urgent priority.6 
I agree and take the same view respecting other places in the world where 
people are attempting to traverse open seas in small boats or cross vast territo-
ry by other risky means of transportation. The Guardian has reported that in 
the first quarter of 2015, 500 migrants drowned in the Mediterranean Sea 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Father Frank Brennan, Essay, Human Rights and the National Interest: The Case Study of Asy-
lum, Migration, and National Border Protection, 39 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 47, 84 (2016). 
 2 See INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION ET AL., RESCUE AT SEA: A GUIDE TO PRINCI-
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alone.7 That number is ten times higher than in the same period in the previous 
year.8 Saving lives immediately needs to be the priority, and that means pre-
venting small, inadequate boats from setting out to sea, as well as preventing 
children from climbing onto moving trains and the like. On this, Father Bren-
nan and I agree. We also agree that prevention can and should be enforced 
consistently with international law. 
II. SAVE LIVES AT SEA 
Our position on prevention may put us at odds with some in the interna-
tional human rights and refugee law community. Any disagreement, however, 
should not be seen as terribly extensive. Father Brennan is correct that the ob-
ligations of the Refugee Convention do not apply extraterritorially.9 Rescue 
ships, even official ones, are not the territory of a state.10 Nevertheless, other 
international rules require the extension of Refugee Convention and human 
rights protections to rescued persons on board official ships.11 
Preventing boats from leaving shore will at times fail and unseaworthy 
vessels will get into trouble or be abandoned by venal captains and crews at 
sea. At that point, all masters of ships have an international legal responsibility 
to attempt to rescue all whose lives are in peril.12 According to the 1982 United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Article 98(1): 
Every State shall require the master of a ship flying its flag, in so far 
as he can do so without serious danger to the ship, the crew or the 
passengers: 
(a) to render assistance to any person found at sea in danger of being 
lost; 
(b) to proceed with all possible speed to the rescue of persons in dis-
tress, if informed of their need of assistance, in so far as such action 
may reasonably be expected of him.13 
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Most provisions of UNCLOS, including this one, are considered binding 
even on states, like the United States, not party to the convention as rules of 
customary international law.14 
Once an individual is on board an official vessel of any sort, such as navy, 
coast guard, or fishery enforcement, the state whose flag the ship flies acquires 
jurisdiction to a certain extent over the individual.15 With jurisdiction comes 
the obligation to extend relevant human rights and Refugee Convention obliga-
tions of the state to that individual.16 Recent cases in the European Court of 
Human Rights explain that states must respect the human rights of non-
nationals beyond a state’s borders if the state exercises control over the person 
or the space where the person is present.17 The state has both of these forms of 
control with respect to persons on board official ships. 
The most important obligation of international refugee law—and arguably 
also a rule of customary international law—is not to return individuals to plac-
es where they will be persecuted.18 International human rights law protects 
people from being returned to places where they may suffer torture or cruel, 
inhuman, and degrading treatment.19 In order to ensure that neither will occur, 
the official ship’s state must do at least a basic review of the rescued person’s 
situation and have knowledge of places where rescued persons might potential-
ly arrive by ship.20 
The conditions in the place of landing must be known because of duties 
by the state exercising under human rights law.21 The flag state may well have 
no obligation to admit the person to its own territory. Nevertheless, the flag 
state may not disembark the person in a territory where he or she might suffer 
serious human rights abuse, such as becoming a victim of torture.22 
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2015). 
 20 See ICCPR, supra note 19, at art. 13. 
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refugee-law/ [http://perma.cc/ME62-CP6P] (last visited Nov. 10, 2015). 
 22 See Refugee Convention, supra note 9, at art. 33; Hathaway, supra note 19, at 211. 
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In the decision that Father Brennan discusses, Sale v. Haitian Refugee 
Centers Council, Inc., the United States Supreme Court held that Haitians res-
cued in the Caribbean Sea by United States Coast Guard vessels could be for-
cibly returned to Haiti with no review of any kind.23 The decision is simply 
wrong.24 Scholars may be reluctant to point this out so directly because they 
are concerned that if states must carry out on-board reviews, states might avoid 
rescuing migrants. As mentioned at the outset of this section, however, all 
ships must rescue. Moreover, attempting to pursue policy ends in how we in-
terpret or discuss the law is part of the underlying problem, in my view, re-
garding international law today. The law is regularly interpreted with an eye to 
various desiderata and not with regard to what it actually says on the basis of 
standard interpretation principles and authority.25 This is a growing problem 
that undermines respect for international law and the sense of the binding na-
ture of international legal obligations. It will be discussed further in the final 
section of this Commentary. 
Finally, we also hear that regardless of the legal obligation, carrying out 
this dual review is too burdensome.26 This objection, too, should be rejected. 
Review is the law.27 Although it is true that reviewing the situations of hun-
dreds or even thousands of people on board official vessels will require re-
sources, countries like the United States or Australia clearly have plenty of 
resources for activities to which they give priority. After all, a single Reaper 
drone costs $28 million USD.28 
III. ADVOCATING AUTHENTIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Much of Father Brennan’s discussion concerns his worry about inaccurate 
interpretations of international human rights law and refugee law that repre-
sent, in reality, advocacy for more rights for migrants.29 I have observed a sim-
ilar approach by lawyers trying to expand the category of jus cogens norms 
beyond what the evidence will bear in an attempt to create stronger rights for 
                                                                                                                           
 23 See 509 U.S. 155, 155 (1993).  
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 26 See id. 
 27 See id. 
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LAW, AND POLICY 230, 235 (Peter Bergen & Daniel Rothenberg eds., 2015) (measuring the cost of a 
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 29 See Brennan, supra note 1, at 56–57. 
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individuals.30 Of even greater concern to me is the attempt to reinterpret the 
United Nations Charter’s prohibition on the use of force.31 In recent years, 
even human rights lawyers have argued that the Charter should be found to 
allow the use of military force for humanitarian intervention.32 National securi-
ty lawyers also advocate exceptions and re-interpretation of the prohibition of 
force to fight terrorism, for arms control, to punish, or to wreak revenge.33 
Unlike Father Brennan, I do not see a “new . . . fundamentalism” in inter-
national law.34 Rather, there is a growing tendency to manipulate and misrep-
resent international law for various agendas—the opposite of strict application 
of the law. This tendency will lead to international law becoming of little use. 
When the law is open to subjective claims, it loses the objectivity and stability 
that critically distinguish law from policy or politics. My response is to revive 
international legal education. Knowing what the law actually requires and the 
reasons to value law in the international community will do more to support 
human rights, the environment, and peace than unsupported claims about state 
obligations or rights. 
IV. RESPOND TO THE CAUSES 
The previous comment about reviving knowledge and respect for interna-
tional law is related to another important point with respect to saving lives. 
Despite the advocates, international law still prohibits military force against 
other states and intervention on the side of rebels in civil war.35 Wars, however, 
are continuing and escalating. War is currently driving a large number of mi-
grants to flee to safety, often on small boats.36 Migrants also flee the economic 
consequences of climate change: droughts, floods, disease, wars over water 
rights, fishing rights, grazing rights, and oil.37 People in the United States and 
Australia who feel no responsibility for migrants seeking refuge apparently fail 
to see the connection between the unlawful invasion of Iraq in 2003, the dis-
                                                                                                                           
 30 See Mary Ellen O’Connell, Jus Cogens, International Law’s Higher Ethical Norms, in THE 
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 34 See Brennan, supra note 1, at 87. 
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proportionate use of force in Afghanistan since 2001, the greenhouse gasses 
poured into the atmosphere in violation of the 1992 United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, and other serious violations of international 
law. 
If these leading states had led on international law, how many desperate 
people would have remained safely at home? 
CONCLUSION 
Father Brennan’s short-term prescriptions are sound. It is imperative that 
they be based on the most accurate and most dispassionate view of the law. 
There is a duty to rescue, and there is a duty to extend human rights and refu-
gee law protections to persons under a state’s jurisdiction. Strict compliance 
with international law will redound to the benefit of states. International law 
forbids the use of military force and it requires protection of the environment. 
Respect for this law provides the world’s best chance for a future in which 
humanity and the natural world will flourish everywhere. 
  
 
